Abstract
In this talk, I develop a more precise epistemological account of styles of reasoning (e.g. Crombie 1992; Davidson 2001; Elwick 2007; Hacking 1982, 1992, 2012; Kwa 2011; Radick 2000). I begin by situating the notion in relation to general logical modes of inference—deduction, induction, and abduction— highlighting its distinctive role in shaping scientific rationality. I then try to advance styles of reasoning as potential candidates to come to terms with scientific progress, understood both in relation to justification (Stegenga 2026) and understanding (Déllsen 2016), as well as with scientific pluralism, especially under its “interactive” account (Chang 2024).
Next, I refine the distinction between two levels of styles: Level 1, large- scale styles of scientific reasoning (e.g. postulation, experimentation, modelling, taxonomy, statistics, historical development), and Level 2, small-scale inferential strategies operative within specific scientific practices (Bueno 2012). I argue that meaningful philosophical analysis of science requires attention to both levels and propose the addition of a local level—a more context-sensitive scale that captures the dynamic interaction between the two.
To substantiate this claim, I examine contemporary research on Alzheimer’s disease (Bemelmans et al. 2016; Hardy & Higgins 1992; Schermer, 2023), illustrating how local configurations of reasoning styles mediate between broader methodological commitments and specific inferential moves. This case is particularly relevant, as it highlights the interplay between epistemic and non-epistemic factors in shaping scientific inquiry. By tracing how styles of reasoning operate across different levels within this research domain, the case study anchors the theoretical reflections and demonstrates how styles serve as a bridge between the logical and the social dimensions of scientific practice.
By integrating conceptual refinement with empirical analysis, the talk aims to strengthen the epistemological foundations of the styles of reasoning framework and enhance its relevance for current debates on plurality, understanding, and the dynamics of scientific change. In doing so, it also seeks to render the framework more responsive to at least some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it (e.g. Kusch 2010; Rouse 2011).
Accompanying Reading Cycle
In addition to the APSE talk by, we want to kindly invite you to our accompanying Reading Circle. It will take place right before the talk in the same room, so:
Time: Thursday, 05.06.2025, 1-3 pm
Location: 3A
We will focus our discussion on an article by Matteo Vagelli:
Vagelli, Matteo (2024). Styles of Science and the Pluralist Turn: Between Inclusion and Exclusion. Revue de Synthèse 145 (3-4):325-363.
As introduction to the use of “Style” in epistemology and science, we suggest this article:
Wessely, A. (1991) “Transposing ‘Style’ from the History of Art to the History of Science”, Science in Context, 4(2), pp. 265–278. doi:10.1017/S026988970000096X .
For further reading regarding the topic:
Daston, L. and Otte, M. (1991) “Introduction”, Science in Context, 4(2), pp. 223–232. doi:10.1017/S0269889700000946.
Vagelli, M. (2024). “Hacking’s Styles of Scientific Reasoning.” In: Reconsidering Historical Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 61. Springer, Cham. doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1007/978-3-031-61555-9_8.
Vagelli, M. (2024). “Styles of Science, Styles of Philosophy.” In: Reconsidering Historical Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 61. Springer, Cham. doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1007/978-3-031-61555-9_9.
Bueno, Otavio. (2012). “Styles of reasoning: A pluralist view.” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 43: 657-665.
Please send a quick message to vinzenz.fischer@univie.ac.at if you are planning to attend the Reading Cycle!
Feel free to bring your lunch!
